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IMPACT ON CORPORATE POLITICAL
INFLUENCE
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INTRODUCTION1
“I think we are at a very critical time in this country. I can tell
you beyond a shadow of a doubt that uh, the Hillary Clinton that
I know is not equipped, not qualified to be our commander in
chief.”2

The public’s ability to discuss and debate the character and
fitness of presidential candidates is at the core of the First
Amendment’s prohibition that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”3 Despite the existence
of this fundamental right, articulated so eloquently in our
founding document, in November 2002, Congress made political
speech a felony for one class of speakers—corporations and
unions.4 Under the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform
†
Glen M. Vogel, Esq. is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies in the Hofstra
University Zarb School of Business. He would like to acknowledge and thank the
Zarb School of Business for its generous grant to support the research efforts
associated with this article. Gratitude also is extended to Jonathan Vecchi, Paul
Johnson, and Eleanor Sharkey for their valuable research contributions.
1
This Article previously appeared in the Spring 2012 edition of THE NORTH
EAST JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, where it won the Best Paper award at the
Annual Conference of the North East Academy of the Legal Studies of Business. See
Glen M. Vogel, Clinton, Campaigns, and Corporate Expenditures: The Supreme
Court’s Recent Decision in Citizen’s United and its Impact on Corporate Political
Influence, 27 N.E. J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2012).
2
HILLARY: THE MOVIE (Citizens United 2008).
3
U.S. CONST. amend I.
4
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107155, §§ 203–04, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 81, 91–92, 94–95 (2002) (codified as amended at
2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006)), invalidated by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130
S. Ct. 876 (2010).

183

WF_Vogel (Do Not Delete)

184

12/10/2012 5:01 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:183

Act (“McCain-Feingold Act”), corporations and unions faced
monetary penalties and up to five years in prison for
broadcasting candidate-related advocacy during federal
elections.5 Outlawing political speech based on the identity of the
speaker appears to collide with the fundamental principles set
forth in the First Amendment. On January 10, 2010, the United
States Supreme Court addressed this collision in Citizens United
v. FEC.6
In one of the most controversial decisions in decades, the
Supreme Court, in Citizens United, invalidated the portions of
the McCain-Feingold Act that dealt directly with corporate
expenditures in support of political candidates.7 This decision set
off an eruption of political debate and fierce partisanship.8 Some
legal scholars and journalists called the decision “wrong-headed”
and claimed the decision was made in “bad faith.”9 Still others
characterized Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion as “more like
the rantings of a right-wing talk show host than the rational
view of a justice with a sense of political realism.”10 The New
York Times, in several editorials, blasted the Court and called
the decision “disastrous,”11 “terrible,”12 and “reckless[ ].”13 In fact,
the decision sparked so much controversy that President Obama
“called out” the Court and specifically referred to Citizens United
during his State of the Union Address in January 2010.14
5

See § 312(a), § 315(a)–(b).
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
7
Id. at 917.
8
Discussing the President’s gratuitous remarks directed at the Supreme Court
Justices and Justice Alito’s head-shaking response, legal experts have remarked
that, “they had never seen anything quite like it, a rare and unvarnished showdown
between two political branches during what is usually the careful choreography of
the State of the Union address.” Robert Barnes, In the Court of Public Opinion, No
Clear Ruling, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2010, at A01.
9
See Floyd Abrams, Citizens United and its Critics, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 77,
78 (2010) (paraphrasing Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 39).
10
Richard L. Hasen, Money Grubbers: The Supreme Court Kills Campaign
Finance Reform, SLATE (Jan. 21, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/
id/2242209/pagenum/all.
11
Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A30.
12
Editorial, After Citizens United, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2010, at A20.
13
Editorial, The Court and Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010, at A18.
14
See, e.g., Editorial, Free Speech for Some, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2010, at A20;
see also Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Says Liberal Courts May
Have Overreached, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at A15; see also Address Before a
6
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According to President Obama, “the Supreme Court reversed a
century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special
interests—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit
in our elections. I don’t think American elections should be
bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by
foreign entities.”15
The Court’s decision in Citizens United has unleashed a
torrential wave of criticism from the media along with raising
new questions and concerns from corporations who are unsure
about how this decision impacts the rules governing the area of
corporate expenditures, and it has left many companies afraid to
run afoul of the law since there are criminal penalties at stake.16
Even now, businesses are afraid to use their funds in support of
candidates since they are unsure what, if anything, the Court
invalidated and what restrictions remain in place when it comes
to corporations expending their own funds in support of political
parties and/or campaigns.
In order to effectively analyze the impact of the Court’s
holding in this controversial 5-4 decision, this article will discuss
the following: Part I will discuss the case law and regulatory
history of campaign finance law in the United States over the
past one-hundred years; Part II will look at the campaign finance
law at issue in Citizens United—the McCain-Feingold Act—and
some of its critical components; Part III will look at the
background of the Citizens United case and the Court’s holding,
along with some of its practical implications; Part IV will
examine some lesser discussed aspects of the decision as well as
the issues that have been misinterpreted by the media; and Part
V will offer some conclusions.

Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 55 (Jan. 27, 2010).
15
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec’y, Remarks by the President in State of
the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-state-union-address. For the full text of President
Obama’s speech, see Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 55 (Jan. 27, 2010).
16
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002 §§ 312(a),
315(a)–(b), 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (2006 & Supp. II).
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A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW

Citizens United was not the first time that the issue of
corporate involvement in federal campaigns was debated by
litigants or addressed by Congress.17 Corporations and unions
have long faced limits on direct contributions to political
campaigns.18 The first restrictions on corporate involvement in
the political process goes back more than a century19 and was
enacted to limit what sponsors considered to be the corporate
corrupting influence on the political marketplace.20
The start of the twentieth century, often identified as the
Gilded Age,21 is known as a period of enormous economic and
industrial growth in America. The largest and most influential
businesses at the time were railroads, banks, and steel
companies owned by the super-rich industrialists and financiers
such as Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, Andrew W.
Mellon, Andrew Carnegie, Henry Flagler, and J.P. Morgan.22 All
of these men were attacked as “robber barons” by critics, who
believed they cheated to get their money and that, because of
their wealth, they were able to gain tremendous influence over
politicians, Congress, and even the Presidency.23
The concept of having Congress address the problem of
corporate political influence all started with President Theodore
Roosevelt’s State of the Union address after the 1904 Election.24

17
See Kirk J. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws:
Dilemmas, Concerns and Opportunities, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 53, 60–61 (1987)
(describing the history of campaign finance regulation as a study in Congressional
confusion).
18
In February of 2010, while giving a speech at a Florida law school, Justice
Clarence Thomas noted that Congressional regulation of the involvement of
corporations in elections dates all the way back to 1907. See Adam Liptak, A Justice
Responds to Criticism from Obama, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A17.
19
Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907).
20
Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1128 (2002).
21
Mike McCabe, It’s No Wonder Ordinary Folks Are Anxious, CAP TIMES (July 2,
2010, 4:40 AM), http://host.madison.com/ct/news/opinion/column/article_9a23dbc63793-5255-b076-65f606688b79.html.
22
See id. (quoting famed Cleveland industrialist Mark Hanna as having said,
“There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money and I can’t
remember what the second one is.”).
23
Id.
24
40 CONG. REC. 91, 96 (1906) (statement of Charles G. Bennett, reading
Theodore Roosevelt’s State of the Union Address).
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Roosevelt was outspoken in his opposition to corporate influence
on politics and suggested an outright ban on all contributions by
corporations to avoid even the appearance of corruption or
influence.25 Two years later, in 1907, Congress passed the
Tillman Act, which prohibited corporations from making any
contributions for the purposes of influencing a federal election’s
outcome.26 While banning political contributions to candidates,
the Tillman Act was silent on the issue of corporations expending
their funds on their own in support of or against a candidate.27
An independent expenditure is money spent by a corporation or
union in support of a candidate in a manner uncoordinated with
any political party or the candidate himself.28
While direct contributions to candidates by corporations
have been illegal since 1907, it was not until 1947 and the
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act that Congress specifically
prohibited independent expenditures made in support of a
candidate by a corporation or labor union.29 Immediately after
Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act, President Harry S.
Truman questioned its constitutionality, particularly the
independent contributions ban, when he vetoed the bill, stating
that it was a “dangerous intrusion on free speech.”30 The bill
eventually passed despite the President’s opposition, and it did
not take long for the Supreme Court to comment on the validity
of the statute’s new restrictions on corporate expenditures.31 In
1948, in United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations,
the Court did not specifically address the constitutionality of the
independent expenditure ban32; however, the majority did
25
See id. In his 1905 message to Congress, Roosevelt wrote, “All contributions
by corporations to any political committee or for any political purpose should be
forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use stockholders’ money for
such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of this kind would be, as far as it went,
an effective method of stopping the evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts.” Id.
26
Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907).
27
See id.
28
2 U.S.C. § 431(17)(B) (2006). Expenditures are: “(i) any purchase, payment,
distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value, made by
any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; and (ii) a
written contract, promise, or agreement to make an expenditure.” Id. § (9)(A).
29
See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
30
Veto of the Taft-Hartley Labor Bill, PUB. PAPERS 288, 296 (June 20, 1947).
31
See United States v. Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 335 U.S. 106, 107 (1948).
32
Id. at 110.
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remark that it had “the gravest doubt” about the
constitutionality of the prohibition.33 Almost a decade later, in
United States v. International Union United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, the Court would
take a closer look at the constitutionality of the Taft-Hartley
Act’s corporate expenditure ban.34 Here, even though the court
held that the expenditure ban, as applied to the specific facts of
the case, appropriately prohibited a union television broadcast
that specifically advocated for congressional candidates, the
Court never specifically ruled on the constitutionality of the
statute as a whole.35 Again, in dissent, three justices argued that
the Court should have addressed the constitutional question and,
had it done so, they would have found the ban on independent
expenditures unconstitutional.36 Justice Douglas, in his dissent
in the Automobile Workers case stated that:
Some may think that one group or another should not express
its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it
advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of lawless
action. But these are not justifications for withholding First
Amendment rights from any group—labor or corporate. First
Amendment rights are part of the heritage of all persons and
groups in this country. They are not to be dispensed or
withheld merely because we or the Congress thinks the person
or group is worthy or unworthy.37

Over the next two decades, the constitutionality of the ban on
expenditures would get bantered about or commented upon in
dicta, but it would never be fully addressed by the courts.38

33
Id. at 121. In this case, the Court did not look at the constitutionality of the
statute as a whole because it held that the statute did not apply to the particular
publication at issue—a labor union weekly periodical that endorsed a congressional
candidate. Id. at 110.
34
See 352 U.S. 567, 568 (1957).
35
See id. at 591.
36
See id. at 593 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the ban on
expenditures based on the belief that corporations and unions were “too powerful”
was not sufficient grounds for denying “First Amendment rights from any group.” Id.
at 597.
37
Id. at 597 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
38
See, e.g., Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 399–
400 (1972) (failing to address the constitutionality of the ban while simultaneously
reversing a conviction for the expenditure of union funds for political speech).
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After the Watergate scandal in the early 1970s, Congress
took another look at the myriad of issues surrounding the federal
campaign finance system and attempted to resolve those issues
with the passage of several amendments to the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).39 FECA, originally passed in
1971, along with its 1974 Amendments, is essentially the
foundation upon which the most recent campaign finance laws
were built.40
FECA, among other things, established new
contribution limits for individuals, political parties, and political
action committees (“PACs”) and established filing requirements
for both contributions and expenditures.41 While controversial,42
the 1974 Amendments to FECA were Congress’s attempt to
restore the public’s confidence in the integrity of the electoral
system and to remedy the loopholes and problems that were
identified after the Watergate scandal.43 Essentially, FECA
imposed three different restrictions on corporations’ and labor
unions’ efforts to influence elections.44
They imposed
contribution limitations and banned independent expenditures,45
they imposed fundraising restrictions, and they limited the
contributions to political committees and PACs.46 They also
imposed disclosure requirements on PACs for contributions
based on the amount contributed, the nature of the contributor,
and the contribution’s proximity to an election.47

39

Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Reform: Relevant Constitutional Issues, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123, 1124 (2002).
40
Kevin J. Madden, Comment, Turning the Faucet Back On: The Future of
McCain-Feingold’s Soft-Money Ban After Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 385, 391 (2009) (discussing the history of modern campaign finance
law).
41
See id. at 391–93; see also, Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (repealed 1976).
42
See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM AND THE COURTS 49 (2005).
43
See Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Financing in Federal Elections: A Guide to
the Law and its Operation, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES
AND LAWS 55, 63 (Auguste V. Anschutz ed. 2002).
44
§ 101, 88 Stat. at 1263–64.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id. § 204.
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Buckley v. Valeo

Shortly after FECA was amended, the Supreme Court
reviewed the constitutionality of the new statutory limitations on
campaign contributions and expenditures in Buckley v. Valeo.48
In Buckley, the Court was asked to address three major issues:
the constitutionality of the limits on direct contributions to
candidates, the constitutionality of the independent expenditure
ban, and the constitutionality of the disclosure requirements.49
When the Court examined the provision limiting the amount an
individual may expend in support or defeat of a particular
candidate, it held that “the governmental interest in preventing
corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to
justify [the statute’s] ceiling on independent expenditures.”50 The
Court remarked, “the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment.”51 Based upon this First Amendment analysis, the
Court applied the strict scrutiny test and held that the limitation
on independent expenditures was unconstitutional.52 The Court
pointed out that “the independent expenditure ceiling . . . fails to
serve any substantial governmental interest in stemming the
reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process.”53
Oddly, even though the Court invalidated the independent
expenditure limitation provision for individuals, it did not
consider the constitutionality of the separate ban on corporate
and union independent expenditures.54
48

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (consolidating a number of cases brought by various
challengers to the FECA Amendments).
49
See id. at 13–14 (stating that the critical constitutional questions presented
are whether the specific legislative bans on contributions and expenditures interfere
with First Amendment freedoms or violates the Fifth Amendment because it
discriminates against non-incumbent candidates’ and minor parties’ ability to raise
funds).
50
Id. at 45.
51
Id. at 48–49 (stating that the First Amendment was designed “ ‘to secure the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,’
and ‘to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people.’ ” (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 266 (1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
52
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.
53
Id. at 47–48.
54
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 902 (2010).
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First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti

Less than two years after Buckley, the Court struck down a
state-law prohibition on corporate independent expenditures
related to referenda issues in the case of First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti.55 In Bellotti, two national banking associations
and three business corporations wanted to spend money to
publicize their position on a proposed state constitutional
amendment that would have permitted the legislature to impose
a graduated individual income tax.56 The statute at issue
prohibited the corporations from making contributions or
expenditures “for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the
vote on any question submitted to the voters.”57 Any corporation
or corporate officer, director, or agent who violated the statute
could be subject to a monetary fine and up to a year of
imprisonment.58 The Supreme Court rejected the state statute’s
prohibition of corporate expenditures related to issue advocacy on
the principle that the legislature does not have the power to ban
corporations from speaking on political issues.59 While the
Bellotti decision did not address the constitutionality of the
State’s ban on corporate independent expenditures in support of
individual candidates, the Supreme Court has offered that had it
analyzed the issue, the Court would have invalidated the ban on
the premise that the First Amendment does not permit
restrictions on political speech merely because the speaker is a
corporation.60
C.

Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce

It was not until 1990, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce,61 that the Court finally addressed the issue of
corporate independent expenditures head-on. In Austin, the
55

435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
Id. at 768–69.
57
Id. at 768 (quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977)).
58
Id. at 768.
59
See id. at 784–85 (“We thus find no support in the First . . . Amendment or in
the decisions of this Court, for the proposition that speech that otherwise would be
within the protection of the First Amendment loses that protection simply because
its source is a corporation . . . .” (emphasis added)).
60
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
61
494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
56
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Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use its general
treasury funds to run an advertisement in a local newspaper in
support of a candidate who was attempting to fill a vacancy in
the Michigan House of Representatives.62
However, under
Section 54(1) of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act,
corporations were prohibited “from making contributions and
independent expenditures in connection with state candidate
elections.”63 Worse yet, any violation of the prohibition on
corporate independent expenditures was punishable as a felony.64
The Chamber of Commerce initiated an action seeking injunctive
relief against enforcement of the Act, claiming the prohibition on
corporate independent expenditures was unconstitutional and
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.65
While the Buckley and Bellotti cases were not controlling—
because neither case directly addressed the constitutionality of
prohibiting corporate independent expenditures in support of a
candidate—the Austin Court circumvented the traditional First
Amendment analysis utilized in those cases and identified a new
governmental interest in limiting political speech: an antidistortion interest.66 The Court posited that the Michigan
statute at issue was “aim[ed] at a different type of corruption in
the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the
help of the corporate form . . . .”67 The Court held that corporate
wealth could unfairly influence elections when it is used in the
form of independent expenditures and, as such, the State had a
“sufficiently compelling rationale to support its restriction.”68
Before Austin, the Supreme Court had never held that
Congress could prohibit independent expenditures for political
speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity.69 Thus, the
Court’s decision in Austin was at odds with the longstanding
62

Id. at 656.
Id. at 655 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(1) (1979)).
64
Id. at 656 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 169.254(5) (1979)).
65
Id.
66
Id. at 659–60. The court stated that it was upholding the restriction on
independent expenditures by corporations, regardless of “whether [the] danger of
‘financial quid pro quo’ corruption . . . may be sufficient” to warrant such a ban,
because corporate wealth can unfairly influence elections. Id.
67
Id. at 660.
68
Id.
69
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).
63
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position that believing a particular group is “too powerful” is not
a basis upon which to deny or withhold First Amendment rights,
even if that group is corporate or labor union in form.70 Austin
was a notable diversion from the Court’s recognition that First
Amendment rights and protections extend to everyone, even
corporations.71 Shortly after Austin, Congress took advantage of
the judicial support for banning corporate and union independent
expenditures and enacted the McCain-Feingold Act.
D. McConnell v. FEC and FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.
Immediately after the McCain-Feingold Act was enacted, it
faced its first challenge in the courts in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission.72
In McConnell, multiple plaintiffs
asserted that section 203 of the McCain-Feingold Act was an
unconstitutional restriction on free speech because the statute’s
prohibition of “electioneering communications” was applied to
more than just express advocacy.73 The Court rejected this
argument and held that section 203 was facially constitutional
because the rationale for regulating corporate independent
expenditures that were express advocacy could also be applied to
ads that are “the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”74
The Court based its holding in McConnell on the presumption
that these types of expenditures could have the same kind of
“corrosive and distorting effects” on the electorate as the
expenditures specifically prohibited under Austin, and extending
that restriction would serve the government’s compelling interest
in countering those effects.75 Even though the Supreme Court
did not elaborate on the definition of “functional equivalent,” they
based their opinion on the district court’s determination that the
70

Id. at 901 (citing United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 597 (1957)).
First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978) (citing
eleven prior Supreme Court decisions which held state laws invalid under the
Fourteenth Amendment when the laws infringed on protected speech by corporate
bodies); see also, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). This
protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech.
See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29 (1963); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
72
540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010).
73
See id. at 205–06.
74
Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 205.
71
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McCain-Feingold Act targeted only broadcast ads because those
ads are the most effective form of communicating an
electioneering message and therefore posed the greatest risk of
corruption.76
Even though the Court declared section 203 to be facially
constitutional with regard to the McConnell ads, it opened the
door to future “as-applied” challenges and remarked that such
challenges could be successful on a case-by-case basis.77 The first
successful as-applied challenge came four years later in Federal
Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.78 Wisconsin
Right to Life (“WRTL”), a non-profit corporation, wished to use
its general treasury funds to pay for television advertisements on
the issue of the US Senate filibuster of Bush administration
judicial nominees.79 The ads were to be broadcast during the
period prohibited by the McCain-Feingold Act80—the period
immediately preceding the re-election of Wisconsin Senator Russ
Feingold. WRTL admitted that some of the funds to be used for
the ads had come from corporate donors.81
The Supreme Court did not issue a majority opinion in
WRTL.
Rather, the Court splintered into three lines of
reasoning. The opinion that is considered the lead opinion,
written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by Justice Alito,
provided that the determination in McConnell—that section 203
could constitutionally prohibit ads that were the “functional
equivalent” of express advocacy—was still valid.82 However,
Justice Roberts elaborated on that interpretation by stating that
“a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of
express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
76

See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 569–71 (D.D.C. 2003). The
district court noted that forms of media that required viewers to “opt-in” or “make a
choice to . . . watch the program” would mostly reach voters already predisposed to
those views and would reach far fewer undecided voters than a broadcast ad. See id.
at 571, 646. For the McConnell district court, this was a “critical distinction” that
separated communications that posed a great risk of corruption—broadcast ads—
from those that did not—viewer choice media. Id. at 571.
77
See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 460 (2007) (noting that the
holding in McConnell left the door open for future “as applied” challenges to the
constitutionality of section 203).
78
551 U.S. 449 (2007).
79
Id. at 458–59.
80
See id. at 460.
81
See id. at 522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
82
Id. at 465 (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion).
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interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a
specific candidate.”83 When this new test was applied to the ads
to be broadcast by WRTL, the Court found that they were not the
functional equivalent of express advocacy because they took a
position on a legislative issue and urged the public to contact
their representatives, rather than specifically advocating for or
against a candidate.84 Importantly, the ads did not “mention an
election, candidacy, political party, or challenger” or “take a
position on a candidate’s character, qualifications, or fitness for
office.”85 Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy disagreed with
the functional equivalency test utilized by Justice Roberts, but
concurred with Roberts’ determination that section 203 was
unconstitutional as applied to WRTL’s ads.86 As a result of their
concurrence, Justice Roberts’ test was identified as the holding in
the case.87 Shortly after the WRTL case was decided, the FEC
promulgated federal regulations to codify Justice Roberts’
rationale.88
As a result of the Court’s holdings in Austin, McConnell, and
WRTL, when the Court was asked to evaluate the validity of a
statutory restriction on corporate speech in Citizens United, it
was faced with two separate but conflicting lines of precedent:
the pre-Austin line that repeatedly struck down restrictions on
free speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a postAustin line that said it would be acceptable to limit the speech of
corporations and unions in certain circumstances. Before looking

83
Id. at 469–70 (reasoning that this must be an objective test that focuses on the
substance of the advertisement and not on “amorphous considerations of intent and
effect,” or other contextual factors that might illustrate the corporation’s reasons for
running the ad).
84
Id. at 476; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 889–90 (2010).
85
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. at 470.
86
Id. at 493, 504 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
87
See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 278 n.10 (D.D.C. 2008). The
parties in the Citizens United case agreed in the district court that Justice Roberts’s
rationale was the “governing test for the functional equivalent of express advocacy.”
Id. This gave authoritative weight to Justice Roberts’s test based on the principle
that “ ‘[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’ ” Id. (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)).
88
See 11 C.F.R. § 114.15 (2007).
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at how the Court resolved this dilemma, it is important to review
the specific sections of the McCain-Feingold Act that were at
issue.
II. THE MCCAIN-FEINGOLD CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM ACT
In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
The
Act,89 otherwise known as the McCain-Feingold Act.
McCain-Feingold Act was one of the most far-reaching overhauls
of campaign finance law since the 1970s and, in broad terms,
banned unlimited corporate donations to national political party
committees, put limitations on advertising by organizations not
affiliated with parties, and banned the use of corporate and
union money for “electioneering communication[s]”—ads that
name a federal candidate—within thirty days of a primary
election or sixty days of a general election.90 The sponsor of the
bill, John McCain, stated that the McCain-Feingold Act,
[S]eeks to reform the way we finance campaigns for federal
office in three major ways. First, BCRA prohibits the national
political parties from raising or spending “soft money” (large
contributions, often from corporations or labor unions, not
permitted in federal elections), and it generally bans state
parties from using soft money to finance federal election
campaign activity. Second, it increases the hard money
contribution limits set by the 1974 amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). Finally, the new law prohibits
corporations and unions from using soft money to finance
broadcast campaign ads close to federal elections (though
corporations and unions can finance these ads with hard money
through their political action committees), and it requires
individuals and unincorporated groups to disclose their
spending on these ads. The law represents the most
comprehensive congressional reform of our federal campaign
finance system since FECA was enacted and amended in the
1970s.91

89

Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107155, 116 Stat. 81.
90
See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887 (2010).
91
John McCain, Introduction: Symposium on Campaign Finance Reform, 34
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017, 1017 (2002).
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By passing the McCain-Feingold Act, Congress was hoping to
stop the unregulated flow of soft money and return the world of
campaign finance regulation to its pre-Watergate position where
there were defined prohibitions and limits on contributions to
political parties.92 The McCain-Feingold Act was the end result
of “a protracted six-year legislative and political struggle”;
however, as President Bush was signing the bill into law, the
first wave of more than a dozen lawsuits challenging its
constitutionality was already crashing upon the Supreme Court’s
Since the McCain-Feingold Act’s enactment, the
shores.93
Supreme Court has heard several cases addressing various
campaign finance issues regulated therein, but none of these
cases has been as controversial or had such a significant impact
on campaign finance law as Citizens United.
The specific McCain-Feingold Act provisions at issue in
Citizens United were sections 201, 203 and 311,94 all of which
served as amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971 (“FECA”).95
Section 203 of the McCain-Feingold Act
regulates
using
corporate
funds
for
“electioneering
communication[s].”96
In
general,
an
electioneering
communication was identified as a “broadcast, cable, or satellite”
communication made within sixty days of a general election or
thirty days of a primary election.97 Section 203 continues by
restricting corporations and labor unions from funding
electioneering communications from their general funds except
under certain specific circumstances, such as get-out-the-vote
campaigns.98
Even though certain types of “electioneering
communications” are permissible, they are subject to the
McCain-Feingold Act’s disclosure and disclaimer requirements
that are delineated under sections 201 and 311.
92

See Madden, supra note 39, at 387; see also 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1).
Richard Briffault, The Future of Reform: Campaign Finance After the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1179, 1180–81 (2002)
(noting that not only did the new act face constitutional challenges, but it also was
under attack and being marginalized by rules adopted by the FEC that could
ultimately lead to further lawsuits).
94
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
155, §§ 201, 203, 311, 116 Stat. 81, 88–89, 91–92, 105–06 (2002).
95
McCain-Feingold Act § 101.
96
See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2006 & Supp. I).
97
Id.
98
See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006).
93
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Section 201 of the McCain-Feingold Act contains a donor
disclosure provision for electioneering communications.99
Persons who disburse an aggregate of $10,000 or more a year for
the production and airing of electioneering communications are
required to file a statement with the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”).100 The statement must include the names
and addresses of persons who have contributed in excess of
$1,000 to accounts funding the communication.101
The McCain-Feingold Act’s section 311 contains a disclaimer
provision for electioneering communications.102 If the candidate
or the candidate’s political committee did not authorize the
electioneering communication at issue, then the organization
responsible for the communication must disclose that the
organization “is responsible for the content of this advertising.”103
III. CITIZENS UNITED & HILLARY: THE MOVIE
Citizens United is a non-profit corporation with an annual
budget of about $12 million.104 The corporation acquires the
majority of these funds via donations from individuals; however,
it receives donations from for-profit corporations as well.105 In
January 2008, Citizens United released a ninety-minute
documentary examining the record, policies, and character of
then-Presidential Democratic primary candidate Hillary
Clinton.106
The documentary, called Hillary: The Movie,
“examine[d] Hillary Clinton’s political background in a critical
light,”107 and mainly focused on
five aspects of Hillary’s political career: firing of certain White
House staff during her husband’s presidency, retaliation against
a woman who accused her husband of sexual harassment,

99

2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)–(2) (2006 & Supp. I).
Id.
101
Id.
102
2 U.S.C. § 441d (2006).
103
Id. § 441d(d)(2).
104
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886–87 (2010).
105
Id. at 887.
106
Id.
107
Aaron Harmon, Comment, Hillary: The Movie: Corporate Free Speech or
Campaign Finance Corruption?, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 331, 333
(2009).
100
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violations of finance restrictions during her Senate campaign,
her husband’s abuse of the presidential pardon power, and her
record on various political issues.108

The film was to be released in theaters and on DVD; however,
Citizens United desired a broader distribution and arranged to
have the movie broadcast on cable through video-on-demand.109
Since the documentary was to be broadcast during Clinton’s
presidential primary campaign, Citizens United was aware that
its movie and advertising might be considered electioneering
communications and would be subject to the McCain-Feingold
Act’s sections 201, 203 and 311.110 As a preemptive strike,
Citizens United sought an injunction to block the FEC from
enforcing those sections on the grounds that they violated the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.111 To Citizens
United’s disappointment, the broadcast was banned when the
FEC declared that the broadcast would violate various provisions
of the McCain-Feingold Act.112 Since the McCain-Feingold Act’s
drafters anticipated the likelihood of lawsuits questioning its
validity,113 it contains a provision that specifically addresses
constitutional challenges to its various prohibitions.114 This
provision requires that these claims be brought before a threejudge panel of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.115 Appeals from this court go directly to the United
States Supreme Court.116 As a result of these jurisdictional
restrictions, Citizens United went to the District Court for
injunctive relief but its application was denied.117 Citizens
United immediately appealed to the Supreme Court.

108

Id.
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 887.
110
See id. at 888.
111
Id.
112
See id.
113
See McCain, supra note 90, at 1018 (noting that “[f]ortunately, the law
ultimately provides for expedited review in the Supreme Court”).
114
Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81, 113–14.
115
Id. § 403(a)(1).
116
Id. § 403(a)(3).
117
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 275 (D.D.C. 2008).
109
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The Supreme Court Elects To Examine the McCain-Feingold
Act on Its Face

When analyzing the numerous arguments presented in
Citizens United, the Court determined that “[i]n the exercise of
its judicial responsibility,” it needed to examine the validity of
the McCain-Feingold Act on its face and not on the narrower
grounds suggested by the litigants and the holdings of earlier
decisions, because deciding the case on such narrower grounds
would lead to further litigation and, in the interim, political
speech would be chilled.118 The Court rejected Citizens United’s
as-applied challenges based on the finding that the documentary,
Hillary: The Movie, was the functional equivalent of express
advocacy because it was essentially a “feature-length negative
advertisement that urges viewers to vote against Senator Clinton
for President.”119 The Court further rejected the contention that
it should create an as-applied exception for videos on-demand
because to do so would require it to redraw constitutional lines
for different types of media,120 which could have the unintended
result of chilling political speech.121
The Court correctly noted that if it applied the test
established in Austin—the anti-distortion test—instead of
examining the statute on its face, it could “produce the
dangerous, and unacceptable, consequence” of banning political
speech emanating from media corporations.122 While noting that
media corporations were technically exempt from the corporate
expenditure ban set forth in section 441b,123 the Court observed
that media corporations also accumulate immense wealth with
the help of the corporate form and that “the views expressed by
118

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 894 (2010).
Id. at 890.
120
See id. at 890–91. The Court also reasoned that an as-applied analysis would
result in other types of media running to the courts to determine if § 441b’s
restrictions applied to their activities and would “chill[ ] political speech” until such
determinations would be made. See id. at 891. The Court also elected not to extend
the holding in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986)
(“MCFL”), which exempted non-profit corporations that receive minimal funding
from for-profit corporations, because it would require the Court to sever a portion of
the BCRA and it would result in future case-by-case determinations. See id. at 891–
92.
121
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 892.
122
See id. at 905.
123
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(i), 434(f)(3)(B)(i) (2006 & Supp. I).
119
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media corporations often ‘have little or no correlation to the
public’s support’ for those views.”124 As the Court went on to
observe, the “line between the media and others who wish to
comment on political and social issues [has become] far more
blurred” with the “advent of the Internet,” blogs, and cable
television, and the decline of traditional print and broadcast
Within the context of this dilemma, the Court
media.125
recognized that making distinctions between media corporations
and non-media corporations would be difficult at best.126
Analyzing the statute on a case-by-case basis could have the
unfortunate result of exempting a corporation that owns both
media and non-media businesses, while simultaneously, a wholly
non-media corporation could be forbidden to speak even though it
may have the same interests.127 Such a result “cannot be squared
with the First Amendment.” 128
Last, after the Court examined the morass of existing
legislation, FEC advisory opinions, explanations and
justifications, and FEC regulations governing the universe of
campaign finance, it concluded that the existing complicated
regulatory scheme acted as a prior restraint on speech in the
harshest of terms.129 As such, the Court determined that the
proper adjudication required it to finally consider the facial
validity of section 441b of the McCain-Feingold Act, and whether
courts should continue to adhere to Austin and the relevant
portion of McConnell.130
B.

Justice Kennedy’s First Amendment Analysis

The First Amendment provides that, “Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”131 It is undisputable
that free speech is an “essential mechanism of democracy”
124
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 905 (citing Austin v. Mich. Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990)).
125
See id. at 905–06.
126
See id. at 906.
127
See id.
128
Id.
129
See id. at 895–96 (pointing out that there are unique and complex campaign
finance rules for 71 distinct entities, subject to 33 different types of political speech,
with 568 pages of FEC regulations and 1,278 pages of explanations and justifications
for the regulations, followed by 1,771 advisory opinions).
130
Id. at 891–94.
131
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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because one of its many benefits is that it affords citizens the
opportunity to hold their elected officials accountable.132 As such,
the “First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application
to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.’ ”133 The
Supreme Court has already recognized that the “[d]iscussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are
integral to the operation of the system of government established
by our Constitution.”134 Thus, in this context, if the First
Amendment is to mean anything, it must mean that the
government is not permitted to fine or imprison citizens or
associations of citizens merely for engaging in political speech.135
Recognizing the above to be true, it is a natural progression
to hold that political speech must be protected from laws that are
designed to either intentionally suppress it, or do so
inadvertently.136 For it is political speech, emanating from
diverse sources, that provides the voters with some of the
information necessary to decide which candidates to support.137
Every first-year law student learns that laws that burden speech,
even political speech, will be subject to “strict scrutiny” review by
the Court.138 In order to successfully make it past this review,
the government will be required to demonstrate that the law
“furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored” to
promote that interest.139 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court
recognized that on rare occasions it has upheld a “narrow class of
speech restrictions” that do infringe on a speaker’s First
Amendment rights; however, in all these cases, the Court found a
compelling governmental interest.140
132
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–
15 (1976).
133
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (citing Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v.
Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
135
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 904.
136
Id. at 898.
137
Id. at 899.
138
Id. at 898.
139
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007).
140
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)) (“protecting the ‘function of public school education’ ”); see
also Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (furthering
“the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (ensuring “the capacity of the Government to discharge its
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The Court did not find a compelling interest in Citizens
United.141 Justice Kennedy observed that the Court has a long
history of holding that corporations are entitled to the rights
recognized under the First Amendment.142 These rights include
political speech.143 First Amendment protections do not vanish
merely because the speaker is a corporation. As the Court
correctly recognized, “[s]peech restrictions based on the identity
of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control
content.”144 The Court went on to note that “the concept that
government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment.”145 Here, the Court recognized
that the FEC set in place a complicated process whereby it, and it
alone, would select what political speech is safe for dissemination
to the public, and in so deciding, it employed a series of
subjective and ambiguous tests.146 Such a scheme would act as a
prior restraint and an unprecedented governmental intrusion on
the right to speak, the likes of which could not be sustained.147
As the Court noted, “[b]y taking the right to speak from some
and giving it to others, the Government deprives the
disadvantaged person or class of the right to use speech to strive
to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker’s
voice.”148 The Court went on to say, “[t]he Government may not
by these means deprive the public of the right and privilege to
determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of
consideration.”149 Moreover, the Court recognized that upholding
the statute and allowing the government to ban corporations
from engaging in political speech could result in suppression of
speech in other media such as books,150 blogs, or social
[military] responsibilities”); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers
AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service should depend upon
meritorious performance rather than political service.”).
141
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
142
Id. at 899–900.
143
Id. at 900.
144
Id. at 899.
145
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976)
146
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 896.
147
Id. at 895–96.
148
Id. at 899.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 904.
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networking websites.151 The government’s interest in leveling the
political-influence playing field between individuals and
corporations was unconvincing when one considers that a “mere
24 individuals contributed an astounding total of $142 million”
during the 2004 election.152 Simultaneously, other like-minded
citizens who have organized under the corporate form were
prohibited from having their voices heard. The Court rightly
concluded that the First Amendment is part of the foundation for
the freedom to exchange ideas, and the public must be able to use
all kinds of forums to share those ideas without fear of
governmental reprisal.153
IV. WHAT DOES THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE LOOK LIKE POST-CITIZENS UNITED?
As mentioned at the outset of this article, Citizens United
caused an eruption of criticism about the holding’s impact on the
world of campaign finance and the potential corruptive influence
of corporations and unions on the political process.154 Critics of
the decision should take some comfort in the reality that Citizens
United will likely have less of a negative impact, if at all, than
originally feared.
First, while some early supporters of the McCain-Feingold
Act touted that its provisions barred corporations and unions
from funding political ads,155 in reality, the McCain-Feingold Act
merely required that corporations and unions finance the ads
through their PAC’s or similar voluntarily financed segregated
funds.156 PAC’s were exempted under the McCain-Feingold Act
151

Id. at 913.
Id. at 908 (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 503–04
(2007)).
153
Id. at 917.
154
See supra notes 8–13.
155
See, e.g., George Will, Political Ads a Freedom of Speech, TIMES UNION
(Albany), Dec. 21, 2002, at B5.
156
See Bipartisan Campaign Reform (McCain-Feingold) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-155 § 203(a), 116 Stat. 81, 91 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2))
(prohibiting corporations and unions from financing electioneering communications
outside of PACs); § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88–90 (defining “electioneering
communication”); see also Trevor Potter, Campaign Finance Reform: Relevant
Constitutional Issues, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1123, 1131 (2002) (noting that corporations
and unions could still run campaign ads as long as they were funded by voluntary
contributions from employees, shareholders, or union members instead of using the
corporation’s general funds).
152
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and, even though they were complicated to create and manage,
they did afford corporations a forum to participate in the political
process.157 So, as long as corporations and unions collected
campaign funds from their members with each member’s
informed consent, these entities could continue to influence
elections and some experts even expected the number of ads to
increase after the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act.158
Moreover, even though corporations and unions are no longer
prohibited from engaging in independent expenditures in support
of or against political candidates, their participation in elections
remains highly regulated. For example, direct contributions by
corporations and unions are still prohibited under federal law
and under the laws of twenty-four states.159 A corporation or
union still cannot donate corporate money directly to, or
coordinate their political spending with, candidates for political
office.160 The laws requiring specific notices or disclaimers on
political advertising remain untouched by Citizens United.161
There is still a myriad of disclosure laws governing independent
expenditures and electioneering communications on the part of
corporations and unions.162 Thus, even if a corporation or union
were to independently expend funds in support of a candidate,
money that is donated to the corporation for the purpose of
financing said expenditures would be subject to the disclosure

157
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 897 (acknowledging that PACs were a separate
association from the corporation but pointing out that they were “burdensome
alternatives” that were expensive to operate and were still subject to extensive
regulation).
158
See New Campaign Finance Law Expected to Enhance Role, Challenges of
PACs New Contribution Limits Provisions Affecting PACs, 70 U.S.L.W. 2684 (2002)
(discussing how corporate and union attempts at electoral influence will not be
stopped by the BCRA but merely re-routed through their PACs); see generally,
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705 (1999) (recognizing the inevitable flow of political
money to channels that remain open after regulation).
159
Life
After
Citizens
United,
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607 (last updated Jan. 4, 2011) (noting
that “[o]ne state bans political activity by unions, nine ban corporate political
activity, and 14 ban political activity by both corporations and unions”).
160
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 909 (noting that Court did not overrule the
ban on contributions).
161
Jan Baran, Citizens United v. FEC: Independent Political Advertising by
Corporations, 2010 LEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 4875 (February 22, 2010).
162
See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 915–17.
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laws.163 And last, despite President Obama’s declaration that
foreign entities will now have greater influence on American
elections, foreign corporations and their subsidiaries are still
subject to the existing spending bans.164
What has not been widely discussed is that Citizens United
has spawned a new wave of litigation concerning several other
aspects of the McCain-Feingold Act. For example, two federal
courts issued campaign finance law decisions in the spring of
2010 that can trace their origins back to Citizens United. In
SpeechNow.Org v. FEC, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was asked to weigh in on the
constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold Act’s contribution
limitations and disclosure requirements as applied to
contributions to a PAC.165 The court held that, since the
expenditures themselves do not corrupt, it should follow that
contributions to groups that plan only to make those
expenditures will not lead to corruption either.166 But this
unfettered right to donate to a group like SpeechNow does not
extend to the right to donate to an actual political party. As
such, “[u]nder current law, outside groups—unlike candidates
and political parties—may receive unlimited donations both to
advocate in favor of federal candidates and to sponsor issue
ads.”167 This particular dilemma was raised in the second
In the
caseRepublican National Committee v. FEC.168
Republican National Committee case, the RNC challenged the
McCain-Feingold Act’s soft-money ban claiming that it had the
right to raise and spend unlimited amounts of money on all kinds

163

See id. (finding no constitutional impediment to the application of the
disclosure laws set forth in the BCRA).
164
See 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a) (2006) (providing that foreign nationals are banned
from contributing to or expending funds in support of political candidates or parties);
see also Randy E. Barnett, Obama Owes the High Court an Apology, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 29, 2010, at A13.
165
SpeechNow.Org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 690–91 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied
sub nom. Keating v. FEC, 131 S. Ct. 553 (2010).
166
See id. at 694; see also Adam Liptak, On Campaign Finance, Rulings for
Advocacy Groups and Against Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2010, at A13.
167
Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 150, 160 n.5 (D.D.C. 2010),
aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
168
698 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D.D.C. 2010).
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of election-related issues169 and that the ban discriminates
against the national political parties.170 The court held that
plaintiffs’ claims were at odds with the Supreme Court’s holding
in McConnell and that the Court’s recent decision in Citizens
United did not disturb the part of McConnell’s holding that
addressed the constitutionality of the McCain-Feingold Act’s
limits on contributions to political parties.171
There are also several new issues that have been raised as a
result of the holding in Citizens United. When President Obama
“dressed down” the Supreme Court in his State of the Union
address in 2009, he, along with other critics, conveniently failed
to mention the group that benefitted the most from the
decisionlabor unions.172 Skeptics could argue that this is
because nine out of ten dollars spent on elections by unions goes
to the DemocratsObama’s party.173 It is interesting that the
majority of the criticism of Citizens United comes from the
political left, and while they lament the decision’s impact as it
relates to corporations, those same critics often fail to mention
the impact on union participation in the electoral process.
Unions admittedly spent approximately one-half billion dollars in
the 2008 election, a figure that dwarfs the spending of
corporations.174

169

See id. at 15455. The RNC claimed it wanted to
raise and spend unlimited soft money in order to (1) support state
candidates in elections where only state candidates appear on the ballot;
(2) support state candidates in elections where both state and federal
candidates appear on the ballot; (3) support state parties’ redistricting
efforts following the 2010 census; (4) support “grassroots lobbying efforts”
aimed at educating and mobilizing voters around “legislation and issues”;
(5) pay the fees and expenses attributable to this case and “other litigation
not involving federal elections”; and (6) pay maintenance and upkeep
expenses associated with the RNC’s headquarters.

Id.
170

See id. at 160 n.5.
See id. at 153 (citing Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910–11 (2010)).
172
Steven J. Law, Organized Labor and Citizens United, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11,
2010, at A15 (noting that labor unions spent approximately half-a-billion dollars in
the 2008 election, significantly more than any group representing business).
173
See id.
174
See id. (noting that while public companies have to deal with the pursuit of
profits and the desires of shareholders, unions have very little holding them back
from engaging in political action).
171
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In addition, while critics of the decision claim the majority
“piously claim it’s about ‘free speech’,”175 they have sat silent, or
in some cases applauded, as the Supreme Court relies on First
Amendment
jurisprudence
in
cases
about
Internet
176
177
178
pornography,
flag burning,
topless dancing,
crossburning,179 and even creating, selling, or possessing films
depicting animal torture for purposes of sexual arousal.180 To
hold that such conduct described in these cases is worthy of
constitutional protection, yet simultaneously support the idea
that a corporation that expends its funds in support of a political
candidate should be exposed to criminal liability seems
irreconcilable. Last, while political pundits and scholars have
criticized the ability of corporations to use their vast wealth to
allegedly influence elections, they rarely express the same
concern for the sudden rise of wealthy individuals who are using
their own millions to either buy an elected position for
themselves or use it to influence the outcome of others.181 Recent
political candidates like Mayor Michael Bloomberg in New York,
California Gubernatorial candidates Arnold Schwarzenegger and
Meg Whitman, New Jersey Governor John Corzine, the Kennedy
and Bush families, Connecticut Senate candidate Linda
McMahon and Florida Senate candidate Jeff Greene, and
billionaires George Soros and Rupert Murdoch, just to name a
few, have all used their own immense financial resources in an
effort to influence the electorate.
While many critics focus on corporations making sizable
expenditures on behalf of a candidate, they lose focus of the
reality that the public’s participation in the political process has
changed with the advent of the Internet. For example, given the
success of Internet fundraising in the 2008 presidential election,
175
E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Corporate States of America?, WASH. POST, Jan. 25,
2010, at A17.
176
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 661, 666, 670 (2004); (invalidating the Child
Online Protection Act (COPA), Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat 2681 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 231(2006))).
177
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 417–18 (1989).
178
California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 117 (1972).
179
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–63 (2003).
180
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584–93 (2010); see also Bradley A.
Smith, Newsflash: First Amendment Upheld, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2010, at A15.
181
Charles Krauthammer, The U.S. House of Lords?, WASH. POST, Dec. 19,
2008, at A35.
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it is likely that in future elections, aggregations of smaller
individual donations will actually outweigh the spending of
corporations.182 In his 2008 Presidential campaign, Barack
Obama raised close to a half-a-billion dollars via Internet
donations to his campaign.183 Of the 6.5 million donations
received by Obama, six million were for $100 or less, with the
average on-line donation being $80.184 According to the Federal
Election Commission, the total sum of individual donations of
$200 or less to all political candidates in the 2008 election
exceeded that of contributions from individual donors who gave
more than $2000.185 In fact, to simplify and hopefully enhance
this trend, some experts have suggested new ways for individual
citizens to contribute to campaigns by way of a tax credit.186 The
proposal provides that each American should be allowed a
limited federal tax credit that could only be applied if the money
is donated to a federal candidate during election years.187 It is
further posited that, if the tax credit could be collected
electronically in the form of a credit card, debit card, or directly
from a bank account, the simplicity would increase participation
and could result in candidates paying more attention to
mainstream issues.188
CONCLUSION
Citizens United, while controversial, marks the end of more
than twenty years of erosion of the First Amendment rights of
corporations and unions, particularly on the issue of political
182

See Richard M. Esenberg, The Lonely Death of Public Campaign Financing,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 332 (2010).
183
See Jose Antonio Vargas, Obama Raised Half a Billion Online, WASH. POST
(Nov. 20, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/obama-raisedhalf-a-billion-on.html.
184
See id.
185
2008 Presidential Campaign Finance: Contributions to All Candidates, FED.
ELECTION
COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/disclosurep/pnational.do;jsessionid=0BE
511403BC45C1D69984A1F7679DC31.worker1 (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (reporting
that the total sum of donations of $200 and under was $427,817,410 while the sum
of the donations of $2000 or greater was $418,956,583).
186
Bruce Ackerman & David Wu, How To Counter Corporate Speech, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 27, 2010, at A13 (proposing that if each citizen had the chance to contribute
“democracy dollars” in the form of a tax credit, that the aggregation of donations
would likely dwarf the sums spent by corporations).
187
See id.
188
See id.
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speech. As Justice Kennedy stated, one of the hallmarks of the
First Amendment is that it should not be applied based on the
identity of the speaker.189 The idea that a speaker who engages
in the political process can be imprisoned for his or her conduct is
the antithesis of what freedom of speech is all about and sadly
brings to mind regrettably similar acts in our history such as the
Alien and Sedition Acts.190 As noted above, there is likely to be
very little change in corporate political activities after Citizens
United because corporations have been participating in the
political process despite the existence of the McCain-Feingold
Act. They just had to do so through their PACs. After the dust
settles, if Congress still believes that it is wrong to allow
corporations and unions to use independent expenditures in
support of or in opposition to a candidate for political office, they
can certainly take appropriate action to address the problemso
long as that action is not unconstitutional.

189
190

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).
See Alien and Sedition Acts, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).

